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Decades of research have deepened our understanding of how the brain forms memories
and uses them to build our mental past and future. But how does it determine whether
an evoked memory refers to the present and can be acted upon? The study of patients
who confuse reality, as evident from confabulation and disorientation, has opened ways
to explore this vital capacity. Results indicate that the brain recurs to a phylogenetically
old faculty of the orbitofrontal cortex – extinction – and structures of the reward system to
keep thought and behavior in phase with reality.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the early studies of patients who lost the ability to acquire
new memories after damage to the hippocampal area (Scoville
and Milner, 1957), the understanding of brain processes allowing
the storage of information has been immensely refined (Squire
and Wixted, 2011). Memories eventually become independent of
the hippocampus, are stored and processed in distributed corti-
cal areas (Squire and Wixted, 2011). Forging plans for the future
appears to involve very much the same neural structures that are
necessary to store information; building a mental future is very
similar to constructing a personal past (Schacter et al., 2007). This
raises the question of this review: how does the brain determine
whether an upcoming thought pertains to “now”? How do we
sense what our current duties are, what day it is, and what ideas
we may currently act upon?
LOST SENSE OF REALITY
Brain damage may deprive humans of the ability to sense where
they are and what their role is, while leaving other mental capac-
ities intact. Hospitalized patients insisting on their obligation
to organize a funeral or to resume military duties were already
documented a century ago (Korsakoff, 1891; Kalberlah, 1904). A
patient of ours, a retired psychiatrist hospitalized after rupture of
aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery, was convinced
that she was actually working as a psychiatrist at our clinic and
repeatedly left therapy sessions in the conviction that she had
to see patients (Schnider et al., 2005a; Schnider, 2008). A young
lawyer, suffering from limbic encephalitis, desperately searched
for her files, convinced that she was expected at court (Nahum
et al., 2010). Both insisted on their resented reality although the
hospital environment and therapy sessions should have indicated
to them that they were not at work and that their ideas were
wrong.
These patients had typical behaviorally spontaneous confabu-
lation (Schnider, 2008), a syndrome first described by Korsakoff
(1891) more than 100 years ago: the patients act according to false
ideas that can mostly be traced back to real experiences (mostly
habits), justify their actions with apparently invented stories (con-
fabulations), are amnesic, and are disoriented regarding time,
place, and their current situation.
The disorder was initially described in alcoholic, malnourished
people suffering from the Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome and in
subjects having traumatic brain injury (Korsakoff, 1891; Bon-
hoeffer, 1901; Kalberlah, 1904). Nowadays, it is most frequently
reported after rupture of an aneurysm of the anterior commu-
nicating artery, traumatic brain injury, or encephalitis (Schnider,
2008). The critical variable is not the type of brain damage, but
the location: all hitherto described patients with circumscribed
lesions – apart from dementia or a confusional state – had damage
to the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex or of brain regions
directly connected with it (Figure 1) (Schnider et al., 1996b;
Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002; Schnider,
2008). Posterior lesion extension determines how much informa-
tion the patients can store but is irrelevant for reality confusion as
described above (Schnider, 2008). Hippocampal damage is often
absent but may also be maximal (Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Nahum
et al., 2010). Extremely severe amnesia and extended hippocampal
damage do not protect against confabulation, as recently claimed
(Dalla Barba and La Corte, 2013).
LIMBIC CONTROL OF MEMORY AND REALITY
These clinical observations alone reveal a fundamental organizing
principle of the limbic system’s contribution to memory con-
trol: while the posterior limbic system with the hippocampus
is necessary for long-term encoding of memories (Squire et al.,
2004), possibly also the retrieval of episodic details (Moscovitch
et al., 2005), the anterior limbic system with the posterior medial
orbitofrontal cortex is critical for the sense of whether an activated
memory relates to the “now” or not. It signals when an activated
memory does not pertain to ongoing reality (Schnider, 2008). It
thus prevents behavior from being based on fantasies, that is, ideas
that do not refer to the present.
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FIGURE 1 | Anatomy of reality filtering. (A) Typical orbitofrontal lesion
causing reality confusion. In this case, the right gyrus rectus is destroyed
(arrowheads) following rupture of an aneurysm of the anterior communicating
artery. (B,C) Superimposition of the lesions of 14 patients who confused
reality for weeks to months. (B) Sagittal cut; (C) axial cut. As indicated by the
shades of gray, maximal lesion overlap was in the posterior medial
orbitofrontal area. The white crosses indicate the area of peak activity in
healthy subjects who performed a similar task as the one on which the
reality-confusing patients failed. (B,C) Reproduced from Schnider (2008), with
permission.
SENSE OF TIME
Reality-confusing patients also have a disturbed sense for the
“now,” the “perceived or psychological present,” defined as the
duration of an experiential process, suggested to take about 0.1–
5 s (Fraisse, 1984). In comparison to non-confabulating amnesics
and healthy controls, reality-confusing patients failed to discrimi-
nate short, temporally overlapping intervals in the range of 0.2–3 s
(Schnider, 2000). Similar findings have been obtained in patients
with damage of the basal ganglia or cerebellum (Ivry and Keele,
1989; Gibbon et al., 1997; Riesen and Schnider, 2001). These struc-
tures were also activated, together with dorsolateral prefrontal and
parietal cortex, in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
of time estimation and reproduction (Bueti et al., 2008). Damage
to these structures does not induce reality confusion. It might,
therefore, be that the disturbed discrimination within the psy-
chological present in reality-confusing patients either reflects an
independent time function, not causally related to reality confu-
sion, or that the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex, which is
difficult to discern in fMRI due to artifacts, holds a central role
in the sense of the “now,” but requires participation of association
areas. The precise significance of the finding is as yet unclear.
EXPLORING THE SENSE OF REALITY
In any case, the temporal difficulty of reality-confusing patients
transcends the perception of the present moment: they appar-
ently fail to place themselves correctly in time and space. They
act as obstinately on ideas that have no relation with the present
as on ideas that refer to the present. How might one experi-
mentally seize this intrusion of thoughts, which have no relation
with the present, into their concept of reality and actions? We
were lucky to develop a task, which tests the sense for memo-
ries’ relation with the “now” and which has proved very reliable
in separating reality-confusing patients from other amnesic sub-
jects (Schnider et al., 1996a; Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Nahum
et al., 2012). The task uses repeated runs of a continuous
recognition test, in which subjects see a long series of pic-
tures and have to indicate picture recurrences within the ongo-
ing run (Figure 2). When subjects do such a task for the first
time, they can recognize picture repetitions on the sole basis
of familiarity (Figure 2A). Healthy subjects performing such
a first run activated the hippocampal area (Schnider et al.,
2000b).
As subjects repeat the task, always composed of the same picture
series, familiarity alone is not sufficient anymore; all items look
familiar. Thus, the recognition of a repetition within the ongo-
ing run now requires the ability to sense whether a picture was
previously seen within the ongoing run (the “present reality” of
the ongoing run) or a previous run; it requires reality filtering
(Figure 2B). Despite this requirement, healthy subjects perform
the task intuitively, with no particular effort: reaction times are
similar to the first run and errors (false positive responses) are
very scarce (Schnider et al., 2002; Wahlen et al., 2011). Indeed, it
has proved very difficult to develop a task version which lowered
performance of healthy subjects (Schnider et al., 2010).
When healthy subjects performed repeated runs of this task,
they had activation of the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex,
area 13 (Figures 1B,C) (Schnider et al., 2000b), which corresponds
to the area of maximal damage in patients who confuse reality.
The task structurally resembles well-known source memory
tasks requiring attribution of stimuli to previous task stages, such
as, the exclusion condition of the process dissociation procedure
(Jacoby, 1991), in that it has multiple runs. Despite this resem-
blance, the processes involved in such tasks are very different from
ours: they require conscious, effortful monitoring (Jacoby, 1991),
activate the dorsolateral prefrontal (rather than orbitofrontal)
cortex (Rugg et al., 2003), and have no predictive value for the
occurrence of behaviorally spontaneous confabulation (Johnson
et al., 1997). Reality filtering is not about knowing to what episode
in the past a memory refers but whether it pertains to present
reality or not.
Our reality-filtering task, as easy as it may be for healthy sub-
jects, proved an insurmountable challenge for reality-confusing
patients, even at much longer intervals between the runs (30–
60 min) than in healthy subjects (1 min). While healthy subjects
and non-confabulating amnesics maintained performance over
repeated runs, reality-confusing patients had a sharp increase of
false positive responses: they believed increasingly more often that
they had already seen pictures within the ongoing run, which in
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FIGURE 2 |Task to measure the sense of present reality. Subjects make
two runs (or more) of a continuous recognition task, each run composed of
the same set of pictures. Subjects have to indicate, in both runs, only
repetitions within the ongoing run (original version: Schnider et al., 1996a).
(A) The first run demands learning and recognition and can be solved on the
basis of familiarity alone. (B) In the second run, all items are already familiar.
The task now demands the ability to distinguish between memories that
pertain to the ongoing run (repetitions within the run, T2) and memories
that do not (d2; not previously presented within the run, albeit familiar from
the first run). Confabulating patients had a steep increase of false positives
in response to d2 stimuli. “d” denotes “distracters,” i.e., pictures’ first
appearance within a run; “T” denotes targets, i.e., repeated pictures within
the run. “d1” and “T1” are stimuli presented in the first run, “d2” and “T2”
are stimuli of the second run. “Yes” and “no” indicate correct responses.
Illustration reproduced from Schnider (2008), with permission.
reality appeared for the first time within the run (Schnider et al.,
1996a; Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Nahum et al., 2012). This increase
of false positives was also tightly associated with the degree of dis-
orientation, that is, the number of false answers to questions about
current time, place, or situation (Schnider et al., 1996b; Nahum
et al., 2012). Recovery of the ability to sense that familiar items
had not yet appeared within the ongoing run was individually
predictive of the recovery of the sense of reality with cessation
of confabulations and inappropriate acts and re-installment of
correct orientation (Schnider et al., 2000a). The increase of false
positives in reality-confusing patients indicates that orbitofrontal
reality-filtering functions by exclusion: it signals when a memory
does not relate to current reality.
PRECONSCIOUS REALITY FILTERING
The conviction that healthy subjects, but also reality-confusing
patients hold in their concept of current reality – the present day,
their current role and location, etc. – suggests that reality filtering is
an early process, which precedes conscious control. Experimental
evidence supports this notion. When healthy subjects performed
a similar task while their brain activity was observed with elec-
troencephalography, processing of new and repeated items in the
first run, which requires learning and recognition, differed over
posterior electrodes at around 400–600 ms (Schnider et al., 2002;
Wahlen et al., 2011). By contrast, processing of new items in the
second run, which requires reality filtering, induced a strikingly
different electrocortical potential than all other stimuli of the
first and second run: at 200–300 ms, they did not evoke a neg-
ative frontal potential common to all other stimuli. Thus, correct
processing of the stimuli on which reality-confusing patients had
failed (first presentations within the second run) differed from all
other stimuli at an early stage, before processes of recognition set
in. In other words, even before we recognize the precise content
of an upcoming memory (thought), the orbitofrontal cortex has
already decided whether it refers to ongoing reality or not.
Spatio-temporal analysis of the electrical activity over the whole
brain indicated that the absence of the negative potential reflected
the fact that new stimuli of the second run skipped a processing
stage common to all other stimuli, which was characterized by a
particularly extended neocortical, temporo-parietal area of syn-
chronous activity (Schnider et al., 2002; Schnider, 2003; Wahlen
et al., 2011), as indicated by source estimation (Michel et al.,
2004). This suggests that, whenever a memory is activated that
does not relate to reality (fantasy), neocortical synchronization
is transiently inhibited at 200–300 ms (Schnider, 2003). Fantasies
would thus assume a different electrocortical format than thoughts
that pertain to ongoing reality and that have passed through the
stage of extended neocortical activation (Schnider, 2008).
This sequence of processes – first reality filtering, then recog-
nition and re-encoding of memories (thoughts), as depicted in
Figure 3A – not only ensures that we distinguish between mem-
ories that pertain to ongoing reality and memories that do not,
but also that we know tomorrow whether we have really experi-
enced a situation today or only thought about it; as these thoughts
(memories) are re-encoded, they are labeled as referring to real-
ity or as a fantasy (Schnider, 2008). In reality-confusing patients
(Figure 3B), memories that do not relate to reality are not filtered
and thus assume the same format as memories relating to reality.
Any upcoming thought,be it a memory of the past, a thought about
the present, or a plan for the future, is sensed as if it referred to the
present. Depending on the evoked memories, patients’ behavior
sometimes agrees, sometimes disagrees with reality. As far as the
patients encode their own thoughts, they experience them as if
they referred to reality and may, therefore, subsequently produce
false statements about the past, present, or future. In agreement
with this interpretation, confabulating patients may recall events
that they have simply talked about, as if they had really experienced
them (Schnider et al., 2005a).
Reality filtering is not limited to visual information: we
observed similar orbitofrontal activation in functional imaging
with visually presented verbal or non-verbal visual material (Treyer
et al., 2003) as well as with auditorily presented words (Treyer
et al., 2006). The process is precise: the electrocortical signal was
much more distinct when stimuli between the runs were iden-
tical with, rather than only resembled previously presented ones
(Wahlen et al., 2011). Thus, reality filtering seems to be challenged
particularly when present reality is very similar to a past reality.
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FIGURE 3 | Functional model of the orbitofrontal reality filter. (A) Normal
function: 200–300 ms after activation of a memory (thought), reality filtering
sets in, inhibiting extended neocortical activation when the upcoming
memory does not relate to ongoing reality. At 400–600 ms, the activated
memory (thought) is recognized and again encoded (Schnider et al., 2002;
Wahlen et al., 2011). (B) Hypothetical dysfunction of reality filtering in
reality-confusing patients: memories (thoughts) are normally activated, but
are not checked regarding their relation with reality; all memories are
activated, and later recognized and re-encoded, as if they related to ongoing
reality. Adapted from Schnider (2008), with permission.
Finally, the process is distinct from other memory control mech-
anisms: to recognize that a stimulus only resembles, but is not
identical with a previously seen stimulus (task described by Gilboa
et al., 2006) also evokes an electrocortical signal at 200–300 ms but
with inverse polarity than the one produced by reality filtering
(Wahlen et al., 2011). That is, the recognition of a memory’s con-
cordance with the present (reality filtering) dissociates from the
recognition of its concordance with the past (its content).
ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX AND REALITY FILTERING
The posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex is a phylogenetically old
and ontogenetically consistent structure (Chiavaras et al., 2001).
One may, therefore, wonder what specific faculty enables it to
assume the role of a reality filter. Reality-confusing patients fail to
adapt to the fact that their anticipations never come true: the hos-
pitalized psychiatrist did not find her expected patients, the lawyer
did not find the colleagues and judges she expected to meet. Yet,
both continued to act according to such anticipations – based on
habits – as if they were still valid. This behavior is reminiscent
of animals continuing to choose a conditioned stimulus, which
was previously followed by reward, even after this association has
proved to be no longer valid. The ability to learn from the fact
that a stimulus is no longer followed by reward and to abandon
a previously valid stimulus-outcome association is called extinc-
tion (Pavlov, 1927; Ouyang and Thomas, 2005). In non-human
primates, lesions of the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex,
corresponding to area 13, induced a specific deficit of extinc-
tion, unlike damage to any other region of the prefrontal lobes
(Butter, 1969). Single cell recordings showed that this area contains
a particularly high density of neurons that specifically discharge
when an expected reward fails to be delivered (Rosenkilde et al.,
1981). Our hypothesis is that the brain uses this neural signal to
label an upcoming memory as not pertaining to ongoing reality,
that is, as a fantasy. The neurons producing this signal might be
appropriately described as “reality neurons.”
Clinical evidence supports this hypothesis: we asked a group of
amnesic subjects to perform a reversal learning task, in which they
had to predict which one of two faces would have a target stimulus
on the nose (Nahum et al., 2009). Reality-confusing patients did
not differ from other amnesics in their ability to learn the associa-
tion, but they had significantly more difficulty in switching to the
alternate face after trials indicating absence of the target stimulus.
Over all patients, this difficulty, but not other cognitive measures,
highly correlated with the degree of disorientation.
The data indicate that, rather than invoking high-level moni-
toring mechanisms, the brain uses a phylogenetically old capacity,
already available to primitive creatures like aplysia (Hawkins et al.,
2006) and drosophila (Schwaerzel et al., 2002), to keep thought
and behavior in phase with reality: it uses the neural signal that
also underlies behavioral extinction. So, evolution did not have to
devise a separate mechanism to assure the behaviorally appropri-
ate use of an ever-increasing stock of memories in higher species
like humans.
REALITY CHECK AND REWARD SYSTEM
These results point to a hitherto unappreciated role of the
orbitofrontal cortex and the reward system in reality filtering
beyond processing the pleasure associated with outcomes. Indeed,
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orbitofrontal activity does not depend on the prospect of pleasure:
the human orbitofrontal cortex is also activated when anticipat-
ing and monitoring neutral events devoid of any tangible reward
value (Schnider et al., 2005b). In such a task, the non-occurrence
of anticipated outcomes induced a distinct electrocortical signal,
which occurred in the same period (200–300 ms) and with a sim-
ilar configuration (frontal positivity) as the signal produced in
reality filtering (Schnider et al., 2007). Indeed, it appears that, in
humans, posterior orbitofrontal activity in response to the non-
delivery of expected reward is driven much more by the need to
adapt behavior than the sole absence of the reward; when there
was no need to adapt behavior, absence of reward did not activate
this area (Nahum et al., 2011). While these results do not question
the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in hedonic processing (Kringel-
bach, 2005), decision-making, and optimizing behavior (Bechara
et al., 1997; Wallis, 2007), they underscore that the orbitofrontal
cortex contains the neural apparatus allowing it to function as a
generic reality-filtering system, irrespective of whether reward is
at stake or not.
The similarity between reality filtering and reward processing
extends to transmitter systems. While select orbitofrontal neu-
rons increase firing when an anticipated reward fails to occur
(Rosenkilde et al., 1981; Thorpe et al., 1983), dopaminergic neu-
rons in the nigro-striatal system transiently decrease their firing
(Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2007). A “hyper-dopaminergic” state
would, accordingly, be expected to impair reality filtering. This is
what we found (Schnider et al., 2010): when healthy subjects per-
formed a very difficult version of our reality-filtering task under
the influence of l-DOPA, which is transformed to dopamine in
the brain, they produced specifically more false positive responses
than when they received a dopamine antagonist (risperidone).
Thus, reality filtering, similar to reward processing, is under
dopaminergic modulation. Of note, a hyper-dopaminergic state
has also been suspected to underlie schizophrenia, another disor-
der characterized by reality confusion (Howes and Kapur, 2009).
Actively hallucinating schizophrenic patients failed in our reality-
filtering task (Badcock et al., 2005). Pervasive confabulations were
described in such patients in the nineteenth century (Kraepelin,
1887/88) before the advent of neuroleptics (dopamine antago-
nists) in the late 1940s. The implication of diverse dopamine
sub-systems and other transmitter systems in reward and outcome
processing is a topic of current research (Schultz and Dickinson,
2000; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010); their role for reality filtering
is entirely unknown.
Available data suggest a link between orbitofrontal activity and
subcortical dopaminergic transmission. The orbitofrontal cortex
projects onto dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain (Joel and
Weiner, 2000), which, in turn, project onto, and modulate activity
in frontal-subcortical loops that connect specific areas of the pre-
frontal lobes, including the orbitofrontal cortex, with themselves
and other frontal areas (Alexander et al., 1986). By transiently
inhibiting dopaminergic neurons, the orbitofrontal cortex might
thus modulate activity in subcortical connections and convey the
signal inhibiting neocortical synchronization when an upcoming
memory does not relate to reality. In agreement with this, we
observed activation of a loop connecting the orbitofrontal cor-
tex with the striatum, substantia nigra, and the medial thalamus
when healthy subjects performed a more sensitive version of the
reality-filtering task containing different stimulus types (Treyer
et al., 2003). This result, together with the pharmacological evi-
dence, suggests that reality filtering not only relies on the same
orbitofrontal signal, but also on the same circuitry as the one used
to signal that an anticipated reward failed to occur. We surmise
that reality filtering is a specific instance of “reward” processing: it
refers to all types of outcomes, irrespective of hedonic value, and
specifically processes the situation that anticipated events fail to
happen.
COMPARISONWITH OTHER HYPOTHESES
Orbitofrontal reality filtering, as described in this review, does
not yet have the status of a distinct, acknowledged brain function.
Accordingly, there is no hypothesis to compare it with. By contrast,
the two obvious disorders resulting from its dysfunction – dis-
orientation and confabulation – have received the attention of
cognitive models.
Disorientation has been linked to amnesia and perception: an
uninterrupted flow of memories and correct perception of the
environment would be necessary to maintain orientation in time
and space (Kraepelin, 1909; Benton et al., 1964; High et al., 1990).
Our data only partially support this notion: the severity of amne-
sia, as measured with a continuous recognition task, is only weakly
associated with disorientation (Schnider et al., 1996b; Schnider,
2008). However, early authors also speculated that there might
be a distinct function of orientation (Bleuler, 1923) and Jaspers
(1973) separated “delusional disorientation” in patients with full
consciousness as a distinct form. Deficient reality filtering might
be the mechanism they thought of.
Confabulations have been the topic of diverse hypotheses. Most
of them tried to explain confabulations as a verbal phenomenon,
irrespective of inappropriate behavior or disorientation. The ques-
tion at the center of these hypotheses was: “What makes patients
tell incorrect stories and fabricate false responses to questions?”
The question at the basis of our studies was: “why do the patients
confuse reality?”
The first question refers to two forms of confabulation: (1)
Intrusions in memory tests (simple provoked confabulations).
These dissociate from all other forms of confabulation and are
independent of reality confusion (Schnider et al., 1996a; Nahum
et al., 2012). (2) Momentary confabulations (also called out-of-
embarrassment confabulations) (Bonhoeffer, 1901; Van der Horst,
1932; Schnider, 2008) that patients produce in discussions or in
response to questions. It is the most commonly reported form of
confabulation. It need not be accompanied by disorientation. Only
a relatively small proportion of patients who produce momen-
tary confabulations have deficient reality filtering (Nahum et al.,
2012).
The second question refers to two other forms: (3) behaviorally
spontaneous confabulation, as defined above – the topic of this
review. It can be conceived as a specific subform of momentary
confabulations, namely, the form caused by reality confusion, as
evident from inappropriate acts in accordance with the confab-
ulations and disorientation. (4) Fantastic confabulations, which
defy any sense of plausibility. These are rare and occur in severe
confusion, dementia, or psychosis (Schnider, 2008).
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Most hypotheses did not distinguish between forms of confab-
ulations. Thus, they have differing significance for the explanation
of behaviorally spontaneous confabulation and reality confu-
sion. The most prominent hypotheses can be summarized as
follows: (1) Confabulations emanate from a combination of amne-
sia with frontal executive failures. The hypothesis stems from
the observation that executive functions may recover in paral-
lel with the cessation of confabulations (Papagno and Baddeley,
1997; Nys et al., 2004) and that confabulations in cohorts of
brain damaged patients are associated with executive dysfunc-
tion (Cunningham et al., 1997). However, patients with behav-
iorally spontaneous confabulation did not differ from similarly
severe non-confabulating amnesics with regards to executive func-
tions (Schnider et al., 1996a; Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Nahum
et al., 2012). (2) Confabulations reflect a desire to fill gaps in
memory or may compensate for the embarrassment of being
unable to respond to questions (Flament, 1957; Conway and
Tacci, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). This mechanism appears
to account for a certain proportion of momentary confabulations,
but was not associated with behaviorally spontaneous confabu-
lation or disorientation (Schnider et al., 1996a; Nahum et al.,
2012). Nonetheless, it may be that this mechanism explains the
content of false ideas, possibly also the tendency to talk about
them. If reality filtering fails, then patients not only talk about,
but also act in accordance with these ideas. (3) Confabulations
emanate from deficient monitoring of the source (spatial, tem-
poral, personal context) of memories (Johnson and Raye, 1998).
Insofar as this function has been defined by experimental proce-
dures, which typically require effortful and conscious monitoring
(see process dissociation procedure, above), it has failed to dif-
ferentiate confabulating from non-confabulating patients (own
unpublished data and Johnson et al., 1997). Conversely, reality
filtering, which precedes the re-encoding of thoughts, is likely to
be a prerequisite for later source monitoring. (4) Confabulations
reflect insufficient monitoring of memories’ content (Moscov-
itch and Melo, 1997; Gilboa et al., 2006). Confabulating patients
who failed both in our reality-filtering task and a task requir-
ing fine distinction between closely similar items were indeed
described (Gilboa et al., 2006). We found that these two chal-
lenges evoked different cortical processes (Wahlen et al., 2011).
It may be that in select patient groups, both processes may con-
tribute to the occurrence and the content of confabulations. (5)
Confabulations results from a deficient temporal tag of memo-
ries or reflect temporally displaced consciousness (Van der Horst,
1932; Talland, 1961; Dalla Barba, 2002; Dalla Barba and La Corte,
2013). The hypothesis is based on the observation that confabula-
tions very often are rooted in patients’ true experiences and falsely
recombine elements of real events. While these authors never pro-
posed a way to experimentally verify the hypothesis, the idea is
entirely compatible with the concept of reality filtering, but with
a twist: reality filtering only explains confabulations emanating
from reality confusion and, therefore, only a certain proportion of
confabulations.
LIMITATIONS OF THE TASK
The continuous recognition task used to test reality filter-
ing, as predictive as it has been in clinical practice and as
consistent imaging and electrophysiological results have been,
has its limitations. First, it may fail to seize memory confusion
in patients with extremely severe amnesia who fail to encode
any information in the first run (Schnider et al., 1996a). Such
patients still failed in the extinction task (Nahum et al., 2009;
Schnider et al., 2013). Second, like any cognitive test, a subject’s
strategy may influence results. One of our patients was so skep-
tical about the difficulties of the second run that he rejected all
items as being repetitions. When the task was repeated indicating
that not only his correct rejections, but also his correct recogni-
tions would be counted, the typical pattern of memory confusion
became apparent (Ptak and Schnider, 1999). Third, in our stud-
ies, patients were matched according to the severity of amnesia.
There are indications that, if patients are selected according to
a single etiology, irrespective of the severity of cognitive deficits,
the task may not be very predictive of reality confusion (Joray
et al., 2004; Gilboa et al., 2006). Fourth, the most important lim-
itation of the task is its specificity. As this review should make
clear, it has been developed to measure reality confusion; it is
not a predictor of all forms of confabulation. This limitation,
of course, applies to the whole concept of orbitofrontal reality
filtering.
PERSPECTIVES
A number of questions remain: what qualifies a real-world mem-
ory, composed of different modalities, as pertaining to reality? Is
there a hierarchy of modalities, for example, with visual informa-
tion, which is used in most experiments, prevailing over tactile
information? Then, there are anatomical enigmas: first, virtu-
ally all patients confusing reality after an orbitofrontal lesion
eventually regain the sense of reality, albeit sometimes only
after many months (Schnider et al., 2000a, 2005a). This sug-
gests that the neural apparatus ensuring reality filtering – pre-
sumably the outcome monitoring system – is redundantly orga-
nized or may undergo plastic changes after damage, similar to
other systems. What brain areas and mechanism allow these
patients to regain the sense of reality? Secondly, only a minority
of people having a classic disease and orbitofrontal lesion actu-
ally suffer sustained reality confusion (Schnider, 2008); a typical
lesion alone does not reliably predict the occurrence of reality
confusion. Thus, do reality-confusing patients have the misfor-
tune of concentrating their reality cells in the areas damaged
by the common causes of behaviorally spontaneous confabu-
lation? Is there a genetic predisposition for such an arrange-
ment or for the ability to rapidly adapt thought to ongoing
reality?
While some of these questions can be examined in humans,
others need the precision of animal experimentation. The associ-
ation between human reality filtering and the capacity to abandon
previously valid anticipations suggests that extinction trials in
reward tasks would be an appropriate animal model of human
reality filtering. In contrast to extinction of fear memories (in
which the animals gain access to a previously avoided stimulus)
(LeDoux, 1996; Quirk et al., 2010) extinction of reward asso-
ciations (in which the animals give up a previously rewarding
association) has rarely been studied because such trials rapidly dis-
courage the animals from participating. Experimentation would
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thus take longer. The investment may clearly be worth it: a bet-
ter understanding of the processes underlying reality filtering
might open new ways to treat diseases impairing the sense of
reality.
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